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COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF MERGER: THE
EXCEPTIONS ARE THE RULE*
Barry M. Goidmant
Victoria Smouse Berghel
Few common law doctrines are as widely accepted as the doc-
trine of merger. Indeed, most practitioners routinely draft land
sale contracts on the assumption that all contractual representa-
tions and warranties will be extinguished by the ensuing deed
Relying upon a comprehensive empirical anal ysis of the deci-
sional law of Maryland's appellate courts, the authors examine
the tortured history of the doctrine in Maryland and discover
that the courts have set a trapfor unwary draftsmen by repeat-
edly graspingfor exceptions to the rule. The authors conclude
that the only areas ofjudicial consistency and certainty are those
where the covenant relates to title, and where the parties have
included contractual pro visions that address the survivability or
merger of representations in the land sale contract. To guide the
care ul practitioner through the merger maze, sample merger
and survival pro visions are appended to the article.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most firmly established common law doctrines gov-
erning real property involves the merger of rights stemming from a
land sale contract into the deed that consummates the transaction (the
"Doctrine").' In essence, because the deed is presumed to supersede all
preceding negotiations and agreements,' all rights and remedies of the
parties in relation to the transaction must be determined by the deed.3
Most practitioners prepare real estate contracts with the belief that the
Doctrine will apply and merge the provisions of the contract in the
deed. Few, if any, "standard" realtor forms of residential real estate
contracts of sale4 include any provisions dealing with merger or sur-
* Copyright, 1984 by Barry M. Goldman, Washington, D.C., and Victoria S.
Berghel, Baltimore, Maryland.
t B.A., 1977, University of Maryland; 1977-78, Oxford University; J.D., 1982, Uni-
versity of Maryland School of Law; Associate, Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine,
Underberg, Manley & Casey, Washington, D.C. Mr. Goldman contributed pri-
marily to this article while he was an associate at Weinberg & Green, Baltimore,
Maryland.
f B.A., 1974, University of Maryland; J.D., 1977, University of Maryland School of
Law; Associate, Weinberg & Green, Baltimore, Maryland.
1. Howes v. Barker, 3 Johns. 506 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808).
2. Millison v. Fruchtman, 214 Md. 515, 518, 136 A.2d 240, 242 (1957).
3. Stevens v. Milestone, 190 Md. 61, 65, 57 A.2d 292, 293 (1948); Levin v. Cook, 186
Md. 535, 539, 47 A.2d 505, 507 (1946); Buckner v. Hesson, 159 Md. 461, 464, 150
A. 852, 853 (1930); West Boundary Real Estate Co. v. Bayless, 80 Md. 495, 507, 31
A. 442, 443 (1895).
4. In Maryland, many practitioners use a form provided by The Greater Baltimore
Board of Realtors, Inc.
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vival of covenants contained in the contract. Although these forms
contain a statement encouraging buyers and sellers to consult attor-
neys, many home buyers do not seek legal assistance. Thus, most resi-
dential, and even many commercial, real estate transactions are entered
into without consideration of the issue of merger or survival of the cov-
enants contained in the contract.
This article considers Maryland merger cases to illustrate that, at
least in Maryland, the Doctrine has been so riddled with exceptions
that it is only applicable in rare circumstances. Because the Doctrine
can no longer be relied upon to provide clear guidance, careful drafts-
men of real estate sales contracts must analyze the exceptions to protect
the interests of their clients.
II. BACKGROUND
The Doctrine raises a prima facie presumption that, upon accept-
ance of the deed, a contract for sale of real property becomes merged in
the deed consummating the contract. The deed, therefore, is the final
execution of the whole contract.5 As a consequence, the Doctrine ac-
cords finality to real estate transactions.
The judicially acknowledged purpose of the Doctrine is to maxi-
mize the "security or safety in [deeds] or in titles held under them" by
preventing a party from raising a claim under an antecedent or accom-
panying contract after conveyance by deed.6 One court has stated that
same purpose: "[I1t cannot be a safe, or salutary rule, to allow a con-
tract to rest partly in writing, and partly in parol."7 The development
of the Doctrine has followed the contours of the parol evidence rule.8
5. Middlekauff v. Barrick, 4 Gill 291 (1846); Smith v. Chaney, 4 Md. Ch. 246 (1847).
6. West Boundary Real Estate Co. v. Bayless, 80 Md. 495, 509, 31 A. 442, 444 (1895);
Bladen v. Wells, 30 Md. 577 (1869), quotedin Levin v. Cook, 186 Md. 535, 538, 47
A.2d 505, 507 (1946); see also R. NORTON, A TREATISE ON DEEDS 135 (2d ed.
1928) ("(i]t would be inconvenient that matters in writing made by advice and on
consideration . . . should be controlled by the averment of the parties to be
proved by the uncertain testimony of slippery memory.") (quoting The Countess
of Rutland's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 89 (K.B. 1604)).
7. Howes v. Barker, 3 Johns. 506, 509 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808).
8. See Dorsey v. Beads, 288 Md. 161, 170, 416 A.2d 739, 744 (1980); Lawson v.
Mullinix, 104 Md. 156, 167, 64 A. 938, 942 (1906); NORTON, supra note 6, at 135
("[T]o add anything to an agreement in writing by admitting parol evidence,
which would affect land, is not only contrary to the Statute of Frauds and Perju-
ries, but to the rule of Common Law, before that statute was in being."). The
parol evidence rule prohibits the admission of any evidence, parol or otherwise, of
prior understandings or negotiations to vary or contradict a writing when the par-
ties have made a contract and have expressed it in a writing to which they have
both assented as the complete and accurate integration of that contract. See gener-
ally 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 573-96 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1981). Both the Doctrine and the parol evidence rule
are substantive rules of law, not rules of evidence. Canatella v. Davis, 264 Md.
190, 201, 286 A.2d 122, 128 (1972).
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In a recent decision by the Court of Appeals of Maryland,9 the court
indicated that "[glenerally contract provisions as to title, possession,
quantity, or emblements of land are conclusively presumed to be
merged into the subsequently delivered and accepted deed, even
though the contract and deed vary."'"
Despite this unequivocal statement of the application of the Doc-
trine, Maryland's highest court has often recognized exceptions to the
Doctrine. For example, the court of appeals has stated that certain
contractual provisions are considered independent of, or collateral to,
the agreement to convey the real property,"' that no merger should oc-
cur because of fraud, mistake, or accident,' 2 that merger was not the
intent of the parties because the deed was only a partial execution of
the contract,'I or, finally, that a specific statutory exception prevented a
merger.' 4 Likewise, when the contract provides that certain provisions
shall survive delivery of the deed, the court of appeals has held that no
merger results because the parties expressly intended that a merger not
occur. 15
Appendix I indicates that of the four criteria (title, possession,
quantity, or emblements) recognized in Maryland, 6 and generally rec-
ognized throughout the country' 7 today, probably only contract provi-
sions involving title will merge with the deed. While Maryland and
other courts, notably New York,' I seemingly recognize these four crite-
9. Dorsey v. Beads, 288 Md. 161, 416 A.2d 739 (1980).
10. Id at 170-71, 416 A.2d at 745 (emphasis supplied) (quoting H. TIFFANY, LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY § 981.05 (B. Berman 3d ed. 1970)). These elements cover a
seller's agreement to convey, for example, a fee simple title to land containing a
specified number of acres, possession free of tenancies to be granted at the time of
conveyance, along with or subject to emblements. Embelments are a farm ten-
ant's right to remove growing crops. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 469 (5th ed.
1979).
11. See Rosenthal v. Heft, 155 Md. 410, 142 A. 598 (1928) (court permitted a contract
of sale to be introduced as evidence of the purchase price when the deed, although
otherwise unambiguous, recited only nominal consideration).
12. See Buckner v. Hesson, 159 Md. 461, 150 A. 852 (1930); see infra notes 46-47 and
accompanying text.
13. See Gilbert Constr. Co. v. Gross, 212 Md. 402, 129 A.2d 518 (1957); see also infra
note 39.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 48-58.
15. Randolph Hills, Inc. v. Shoreham Developers, Inc., 266 Md. 182, 292 A.2d 662
(1972) (discussing explicit survival language in sale contracts); see also infra text
accompanying notes 59-63.
16. See Dorsey v. Beads, 288 Md. 161, 416 A.2d 739 (1980).
17. See, e.g., City of Westminster v. Skyline Vista Dev. Co., 163 Colo. 394, 431 P.2d
26 (1967); Jolley v. Idaho Sec., Inc., 90 Idaho 373, 414 P.2d 879 (1966); Mueller v.
Bankers Trust Co., 262 Mich. 53, 247 N.W. 103 (1933); Hazlett v. Clark, 652
S.W.2d 135 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Caparrelli v. Rolling Greens, Inc., 39 N.J. 585,
190 A.2d 369 (1963); Chavez v. Gomez, 77 N.M. 341, 423 P.2d 31 (1967); Caresk
Corp. v. Stephen Schifter, Inc., 431 Pa. 550, 246 A.2d 365 (1968); see also Annot.,
38 A.L.R.2d 1310 (1954); Annot., 84 A.L.R. 1008 (1933).
18. For a discussion of those cases dealing with New York, see Comment, Merger of
Land Contract in Deed, 25 ALBANY L. REV. 122 (1961).
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ria, they are reluctant to merge covenants contained in a contract of
sale when they relate to anything other than title, 9 or, as on one occa-
sion, when they relate to a restrictive covenant.20 At least one commen-
tator has noted that "each decade of cases presents new instances in
which acceptance of the deed did not result in the claimed merger.'
Accordingly, attorneys should be wary of reliance on the Doctrine to
merge covenants in deeds.
III. ANALYSIS
An analysis of all the decisions rendered by the Court of Appeals
of Maryland in this area demonstrates that the court has been retreat-
ing from application of the Doctrine in all areas, except when applied
to a covenant that relates to title. Appendix I shows that from 1846 to
1980, the court examined the Doctrine in twenty-one cases. During this
135-year span, the court held that a merger occurred in only ten of
those cases. In the first seven cases, the court held that a merger oc-
curred, even when the contractual covenant related to matters other
than title. Of the fourteen remaining cases, decided between 1928 and
1980, the court of appeals refused to merge the covenants at issue into
the deeds in eleven of those fourteen cases. The three cases in which
the court found a merger in this later time period involved questions of
title or of a restrictive covenant.
The policy goal served by the Doctrine is to ensure security or
safety in deeds.22 Other than with respect to title, however, this policy
goal has not been achieved in Maryland because of the numerous ex-
ceptions the court of appeals has carved out of the Doctrine. The fol-
lowing examination of these exceptions provides a better
understanding of the scope and limitations of the Doctrine and illus-
trates that the Maryland practitioner can no longer assume that the
Doctrine will automatically apply to real estate transactions.
A. Collateral Covenants
The major exception to the Doctrine rests on the theory of collat-
eral covenants, which are interpreted narrowly to mean any agreements
19. See Haviland v. Dawson, 210 A.2d 551, 554 (D.C. 1965) (delivery and acceptance
of deed to lot did not bar claim for failure to convey rights of way over adjacent
land); Baxter v. Stubbs, 620 P.2d 68 (Utah 1980) (agreement did not merge in
deed which granted seller a 25% interest in buyer, a limited partnership, so that
seller, in effect, reserved a 25% interest in property); see also N. FRIEDMAN, CON-
TRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY § 7.2 (3d ed. 1975) (discussing
deed as merger of rights of purchaser or seller); Dunham, Merger by Deed- Was
It Ever Automatic?, 10 GA. L. REV. 419 (1976).
20. Millison v. Fruchtman, 214 Md. 515, 136 A.2d 240 (1957) (contractual agreement
that use of property to be conveyed would be limited to certain specified commer-
cial uses merged in deed that contained inconsistent restrictions on use).
21. Dunham, supra note 19, at 436.
22. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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contained in a contract that are not directly related to the agreement to
sell or buy real estate. The court of appeals has long held that collat-
eral agreements or conditions that are not incorporated in the deed, or
that are inconsistent with it, do not merge in the deed. For example, in
Dorsey v. Beads,23 the court adopted the following rule:
The general rule is that a deed includes all prior negotia-
tions and agreements leading up to its execution and delivery,
so that a merger is thereby effected. However, such rule does
not apply to real estate contract provisions or other matters
not performed or consummated by delivery and acceptance of
the deed. In other words, collateral agreements or conditions
not incorporated in the deed or inconsistent therewith are not
merged in the deed.24
The builder in Dorsey claimed that a couple for whom he had built a
house had not paid the full purchase price at closing when title was
conveyed. In applying the above rule to these facts, the Dorsey court
held that a contractual provision as to the amount of the purchase price
was collateral to, and did not merge with, the deed.25
Perhaps because strict application of the Doctrine may lead to
harsh results,26 the court of appeals has readily found a prior or con-
temporaneous oral or written agreement collateral to, and consistent
with, the deed and, therefore, admissible.27 Other examples of cove-
nants which the court has found collateral include provisions for spe-
cific improvements, 28 the construction of a house, 29 and the payment of
the purchase price for real estate by means of a mortgage. 30
Two categories of collateral covenants deserving special attention
are those involving the amount of consideration involved in a transac-
tion,3' and those dealing with the construction of a house on a lot con-
23. 288 Md. 161, 416 A.2d 739 (1980).
24. Id at 170, 416 A.2d at 744-45 (quoting TIFFANY, supra note 10, § 981.05).
25. Dorsey, 288 Md. at 170, 416 A.2d at 744-45.
26. See McSweyn v. Musselshell County, 632 P.2d 1095, 1103 (Mont. 1981) ("Merger
by deed, as a legal concept, is so drastic that exceptions to it have grown up which
are as old as the concept itself.") (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
27. See, e.g., Levin v. Cook, 186 Md. 535, 47 A.2d 505 (1946) (conveyance of a lease-
hold property with an express warranty as to the efficiency and good condition of
a heating plant); Rosenthal v. Heft, 155 Md. 410, 142 A. 598 (1928) (failure of
deed to mention purchase price allows use of contract).
28. Stevens v. Milestone, 190 Md. 61, 57 A.2d 292 (1948) (although deed did not
mention the improvements to be constructed by the seller, the court permitted
inquiry into the contractual agreement to build a dwelling containing insulation
and cellar windows).
29. Kandalis v. Paul Pet Constr. Co., 210 Md. 319, 123 A.2d 345 (1956).
30. Dorsey v. Beads, 288 Md. 161, 416 A.2d 739 (1980).
31. In most circumstances, questions about the amount of consideration should not
arise in fully executed contracts, because Maryland law provides:
[A] statement of the amount of actual consideration paid or to be paid
. . . shall either be included in every instrument taxable under this sec-
tion offered for record as part of its recitals or as part of the acknowl-
19831
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veyed in conformance with plans and specifications contained in the
contract of sale, but not incorporated into the deed conveying the lot.
With respect to the former category, three cases3 2 address the question
of the proper amount of consideration involved in the transaction. In
all of these cases, the court held that no merger had occurred. In Dor-
sey,33 the court concluded that " '[c]ontractual provisions as to the pay-
ment of the purchase price are not merged with the deed .. ",
While no underlying rationale has ever been articulated by the judici-
ary or by commentators as to why questions involving the amount of
consideration have been deemed collateral, from an empirical study
this seems one of the more firmly rooted exceptions to the Doctrine.
Seven cases relate to the second category of cases, 35 which involve
the construction of a house in conformance with plans and specifica-
tions contained in the contract of sale, but which were not referred to in
the deed. Of these cases, only one36 held that nothing prevented a
edgement, or be contained in a separate affidavit accompanying the
instrument, signed under the penalties of perjury by a party to the instru-
ment or by the agent of the party.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 277(b)(3) (1980); see also id. § 278A(b)(3) (requiring
that statement of amount of consideration be included in every taxable instrument
offered for record).
32. Dorsey v. Beads, 288 Md. 161, 416 A.2d 739 (1980); Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v.
Strauff, 171 Md. 305, 189 A. 195 (1937); Rosenthal v. Heft, 155 Md. 410, 142 A.
598 (1928).
33. Dorsey v. Beads, 288 Md. 161, 416 A.2d 739 (1980).
34. Id at 171, 416 A.2d at 745 (quoting 8A G. THOMPSON, THE MODERN LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY § 4458, at 334 (J. Grimes repl. vol. 1963).
35. Gilbert Constr. Co. v. Gross, 212 Md. 402, 129 A.2d 518 (1957); Kandalis v. Paul
Pet Constr. Co., 210 Md. 319, 123 A.2d 345 (1956); Barrie v. Abate, 209 Md. 578,
121 A.2d 862 (1956); Laurel Realty Co. v. Himelfarb, 194 Md. 672, 72 A.2d 23
(1950); Edison Realty Co. v. Bauernschub, 191 Md. 451, 62 A.2d 354 (1948); Ste-
vens v. Milestone, 190 Md. 61, 57 A.2d 292 (1948); West Boundary Real Estate
Co. v. Bayless, 80 Md. 495, 31 A. 442 (1895).
36. West Boundary Real Estate Co. v. Bayless, 80 Md. 495, 31 A. 442 (1895). West
Boundary involved specific enforcement of a contract to erect on a certain lot a
dwelling costing not less than $4,000. In consummation of the contract between
the parties, the grantor executed and delivered a deed to the grantee for the lot.
The deed recited consideration of $5,200, and it also provided that the grantee
could not, within 10 years after the date of the deed, erect on the lot any dwelling
costing less than $3,000, and that the grantee could not construct any improve-
ments within 30 feet from the front building line. Id. at 508, 31 A. at 443. The
West Boundary court refused to admit evidence of the contract because it would
directly contradict the deed. For instance, the contract provided that no improve-
ments could be erected within 30 feet from the rear building line, while the deed
stated that no improvements could be erected within 30 feet from the front build-
ing line. In addition, although the contract declared that a building costing at
least $4,000 must be constructed on the lot, the deed stated that a building costing
at least $3,000 must be erected on the lot. Thus, rather than finding the covenants
collateral to the deed, the court found the covenants wholly inconsistent with the
deed. The court reasoned that such an obvious inconsistency showed an intent
"that the [deed] was to take the place of all antecedent negotiations .... ." d. at
509, 31 A. at 444. This decision is distinguishable from other cases involving the
Common Law Doctrine of Merger
merger from occurring.37 In the remaining six cases no merger oc-
curred3" substantially for the reasons stated by the court in Laurel Re-
alty Co. v. Himelfarb: 9 "We have expressly held there is no merger
where the contract calls for the construction of a house in accordance
with plans and specifications, on land to be conveyed."4 The rationale
is that the construction aspects of the contract did not directly relate to
the agreement to sell real estate and, therefore, should not merge in the
deed.
B. Partial Execution
Since the Court of Appeals of Maryland has examined the Doc-
trine, it has insisted that one of the exceptions occurs when "it appears
that the execution of the deed is only a partial execution of the con-
tract."'" The distinction between a partial execution and a collateral
covenant is a subtle one, with the difference being, in the former case,
that one contract covers two items (collateral covenant) and, in the lat-
ter case, that a one-item contract is not completed (partial execution).
The partial execution exception has never been raised in Maryland in-
dependently of the "collateral covenant" exception, and has never been
the sole basis of relief.42 Furthermore, this exception is only rarely
construction of homes according to plans and specifications in which the court
held that the contract had not merged with the deed.
In West Boundary, the obvious inconsistency between the documents clearly
indicated that the parties had modified their agreement by the deed, and the ques-
tion whether the covenant was collateral became irrelevant. The other cases in
this category did not involve a contradiction between a contract and a deed; more
often,.the deed was silent as to the specific covenant. See supra note 35.
37. West Boundary, 80 Md. at 509, 31 A. at 444.
38. See Gilbert Constr. Co. v. Gross, 212 Md. 402, 129 A.2d 518 (1957) (covenant to
install ductless furnaces in newly constructed homes "in a workmanlike manner
and in accordance with the best practice" did not merge into deed); Kandalis v.
Paul Pet Constr. Co., 210 Md. 319, 123 A.2d 345 (1956) (covenant to construct
dwelling "in substantial compliance with D Home" did not merge into deed);
Barrie v. Abate, 209 Md. 578, 121 A.2d 862 (1956) (promise to build waterproof
brick dwelling on land in accordance with certain specifications did not merge
into deed); Laurel Realty Co. v. Himelfarb, 194 Md. 672, 72 A.2d 23 (1950)
(promise to construct a home in accordance with plans and specifications did not
merge into deed); Edison Realty Co. v. Bauernschub, 191 Md. 451, 62 A.2d 354
(1948) (allegation of collateral oral agreement to construct house containing all
features of sample house not demurrable on the basis of merger); Stevens v. Mile-
stone, 190 Md. 61, 57 A.2d 292 (1948) (oral agreement to build house with front
cellar windows and insulation in accordance with furnished plans did not merge
into deed); cf. Brummel v. Clifton Realty Co., 146 Md. 56, 125 A. 905 (1924)
(court of equity may compel vendor specifically to perform construction when the
uncompleted work is clearly defined and complainant has no adequate remedy at
law).
39. 194 Md. 672, 72 A.2d 23 (1950).
40. Id at 677, 72 A.2d at 24.
41. Id (emphasis supplied).
42. See Appendix I.
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raised as such in other jurisdictions.43
In its more recent decisions, the court of appeals has apparently
recognized the essentially identical nature of the "partial execution"
and "collateral covenant" exceptions, by gradually incorporating the
two, even though this incorporation results in a clumsy hybrid.,, Thus,
what appeared to be two separate, if ambiguous, exceptions is now only
one.
C. Fraud, Accident, or Mistake
Other than collateral agreements, the other major exceptions to the
Doctrine concern transactions involving fraud, accident, or mistake.
Buckner v. Hesson ,45 the only Maryland case on the subject, involved a
bill for specific performance of a contract to convey property free from
ground rent. The bill alleged that the conveyance, by the terms of the
deed, subjected the property to ground rent. The deed was prepared by
the seller's son-in-law, an attorney, who also had been employed by the
buyer, at the seller's suggestion, to represent the buyer in the same
transaction. The Buckner court could not decide which exception to
the Doctrine specifically applied, so it rested its decision on all three
(fraud, accident, or mistake). Interestingly, while the buyer had not
charged the seller with either fraud, accident, or mistake, the court rea-
soned that "at least one of these" must have occurred.4 6
D. Statutory Exceptions for Residential Property
Because a strict application of the Doctrine may lead to harsh re-
sults, courts have readily found a prior or contemporaneous oral or
written agreement collateral to and consistent with the deed and, there-
fore, admissible. 47 This judicial mitigation of the Doctrine, however,
does not extend as far as the statutory remedy provided in the Mary-
43. See, e.g., Prell v. Trustees of Baird & Warner Mortgage & Realty Investors, 179
Ind. App. 642, 654 n.l, 386 N.E.2d 1221, 1230 n.l (1979) ("[D]octrine of merger
does not apply where the deed constitutes only part performance of the contract
and the unperformed portions of the contract are not merged into the deed.");
Long v. Hartwell, 34 N.J.L. 116 (1870) ("[The Doctrine] will not apply to cases
where two things are to be conveyed by distinct acts. The conveyance of one
would purport to be only in part execution, and should not be held to destroy the
vitality of the contract so far as it relates to the part executed."); Witbeck v.
Waine, 16 N.Y. 532, 535 (1858) ("The rule, however, is not applicable where the
last contract covers only a part of the subjects embraced in the prior one."); Harris
v. Rowe, 593 S.W.2d 303, 307 (Tex. 1980) ("A contract of sale, which provides for
the performance of acts other than the conveyance remains in full force and effect
as to such other acts.").
44. See, e.g., Gilbert Constr. Co. v. Gross, 212 Md. 402, 409, 129 A.2d 518, 521
(1957); Kandalis v. Paul Pet Constr. Co., 210 Md. 319, 123 A.2d 345 (1956).
45. 159 Md. 461, 150 A. 852 (1930).
46. Id. at 464, 150 A. at 853.
47. See, e.g., Levin v. Cook, 186 Md. 535, 540, 47 A.2d 505, 507 (1946); Rosenthal v.
Heft, 155 Md. 410, 418, 142 A. 598, 602 (1928); Bryant v. Wilson, 71 Md. 440, 443,
18 A. 916, 916-17 (1889); see also supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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land Consumer Protection Act (the "Act").4" Further, Maryland statu-
tory law imposes certain express and implied warranties on contracts
48. The Act, originally codified in 1973 in the Commercial Law article of the Anno-
tated Code of Maryland, provides in pertinent part:
§ 13-301. Unfair or deceptive trade practices defined. Unfair or deceptive
trade practices include any:
(1) False, falsely disparaging, or misleading oral or written statement,
visual description, or other representation of any kind which has the ca-
pacity, tendency, or effect of deceiving or misleading consumers;
(3) Failure to state a material fact if the failure deceives or tends to
deceive;
(4) Disparagement of the goods, realty, services, or business of another
by a false or misleading representation of a material fact;
(5) Advertisement or offer of consumer goods, consumer realty, or con-
sumer services;
(i) Without intent to sell, lease or rent them as advertised or offered;
or
(ii) With intent not to supply reasonably expected public demand,
unless the advertisement or offer discloses a limitation of quantity
or other qualifying condition;
(6) False or misleading representation of fact which concerns:
(i) The reason for or the existence or amount of a price reduction;
or
(ii) A price in comparison to a price of a competitor or to one's own
price at a past or future time;
(8) False statement which concerns the reason for offering or supplying
consumer goods, consumer realty, or consumer services at sale or dis-
count prices;
(9) Deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or
knowing concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with
the intent that a consumer rely on the same in connection with:
(i) The promotion or sale of any consumer goods, consumer realty,
or consumer service; or
(ii) A contract or other agreement for the evaluation, perfection,
marketing, brokering or promotion of an invention; or
(iii) The subsequent performance of a merchant with respect to an
agreement of sale, lease or rental;
(14) Any act or omission that relates to a residential building and that is
chargeable as a misdemeanor under or otherwise violates a provision of
the Energy Conservation Building Standards Act, Article 78, § 54-I of
the Code.
§ 13-302. Deception or damage unnecessary. Any practice prohibited by this
title is a violation of this title, whether or not any consumer in fact has been mis-
led, deceived, or damaged as a result of the practice.
§ 13-303. Practices generally prohibited. A person may not engage in any
unfair or deceptive trade practice, as defined in this subtitle or as further defined
by the Division, in:
(1) The sale, lease, rental, loan, or bailment of any consumer goods,
consumer realty, or consumer services;
(2) The offer for sale, lease, rental, loan or bailment of consumer goods,
consumer realty or consumer services;
(3) The extension of consumer credit; or
(4) The collection of consumer debts.
MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 13-301 to -303 (1983).
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for sale of newly constructed homes.4 9 Thus, in residential real estate
49. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 10-201 to -205 (1981):
§ 10-201. Definitions.
(a) In general - In this subtitle, the following words have the meanings
indicated unless otherwise apparent from context.
(b) Improvements - "Improvements" includes every newly constructed
private dwelling unit, and fixture and structure which is made a part of a
newly constructed private dwelling unit at the time of construction by
any building contractor or subcontractor.
(c) Purchaser - "Purchaser" means the original purchaser of improved
realty, and the heirs and personal representatives of the original
purchaser.
(d) Realty - "Realty" includes both freehold estates and redeemable
leasehold estates.
(e) Vendor - "Vendor" means any person engaged in the business of
erecting or otherwise creating an improvement on realty, or to whom a
completed improvement has been granted for resale in the course of his
business.
§ 10-202. Creation of express warranties; exclusion or modification of express
warranty.
(a) Creation of warranties - Express warranties by a vendor are created
as follows:
(1) Any written affirmation of fact or promise which relates to the im-
provement and is made a part of the basis of the bargain between the
vendor and the purchaser creates an express warranty that the improve-
ment conforms to the affirmation or promise.
(2) Any written description of the improvement, including plans and
specifications of it, which is made a part of the basis of the bargain be-
tween the vendor and the purchaser creates an express warranty that the
improvement conforms to the description.
(3) Any sample or model which is made a part of the basis of the bar-
gain between the vendor and the purchaser creates an express warranty
that the improvement conforms substantially to the sample or model.
(b) Formal words unnecessary - To create an express warranty, it is not
necessary to use formal words, such as "warranty" or "guarantee," or
that there be a specific intention to make a warranty. However, an affir-
mation merely of the value of the improvement or a statement purport-
ing to be an opinion or commendation of the improvement does not
create a warranty.
(c) Exclusion or modification of express warranty - If an express war-
ranty is made under subsection (a), neither words in the contract of sale,
the deed, other instrument of grant, nor merger of the contract of sale into
the deed or any other instrument of grant is effective to exclude or mod-
ify the warranty. At any time after the execution of the contract of sale,
the warranty may be excluded or modified wholly or partially by a writ-
ten instrument, signed by the purchaser, setting forth in detail the war-
ranty to be excluded or modified, the consent of the purchaser to
exclusion or modification, and the terms of the new agreement with re-
spect to it. [emphasis supplied]
§ 10-203. Implied warranties.
(a) Warranties which are implied - Except as provided in subsection (b)
or unless excluded or modified pursuant to subsection (d), in every sale,
warranties that are implied that, at the time of the delivery of the deed to
a complete improvement or at the time of completion of an improve-
ment not completed when the deed is delivered, the improvement is:
(1) Free from faulty materials;
(2) Constructed according to sound engineering standards;
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transactions, the Act and the new home warranty statute may lead to
different results than would the Doctrine.
The Act, which was amended in 1976 to cover consumer real es-
tate transactions, provides a private cause of action for consumers
harmed by several specified unfair or deceptive trade practices consist-
ing of various types of false and misleading statements made in con-
sumer transactions. The Act apparently carves another exception to
the traditional Doctrine by declaring that a grantor may later be chal-
lenged upon the representations, or lack of them, that produced the
transaction.50
Maryland's appellate courts have not yet applied the Act to cases
in which the Doctrine might otherwise apply. An examination of
(3) Constructed in a workmanlike manner; and
(4) Fit for habitation.
(b) Exception - The warranties of subsection (a) do not apply to any
condition that an inspection of the premises would reveal to a reason-
ably diligent purchaser at the time the contract is signed.
(c) Implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose - If the pur-
chaser, expressly or by implication, makes known to the vendor the par-
ticular purpose for which the improvement is required, and it appears
that the purchaser relies on the vendor's skill and judgment, there is an
implied warranty that the improvement is reasonably fit for the purpose.
(d) Exclusion or modification for implied warranty - Neither words in
the contract of sale, nor the deed, nor merger of the contract of sale into
the deed is effective to exclude or modify any implied warranty. How-
ever, if the contract of sale pertains to an improvement then completed,
an implied warranty may be excluded or modified wholly or partially by
a written instrument, signed by the purchaser, setting forth in detail the
warranty to be excluded or modified, the consent of the purchaser to
exclusion or modification, and the terms of the new agreement with re-
spect to it.
§ 10-204. Breach of warranty; expiration of warranty; limitations of actions.
(a) Breach of warranty - If any warranty provided for in this subtitle is
breached, the court may award legal or equitable relief, or both, as jus-
tice requires.
(b) Expiration of warranty - Unless an express warranty specifies a
longer period of time, the warranties provided for in this subtitle expire:
(i) In the case of a dwelling completed at the time of the delivery of the
deed to the purchaser, one year after the delivery or after taking of pos-
session by the purchaser, whichever occurs first; and
(2) In the case of a dwelling not completed at the time of delivery of the
deed to the purchaser, one year after the date of the completion or taking
of possession by the purchaser, whichever occurs first.
(c) Limitation of actions - Any action arising under this subtitle shall
be commenced within two years after the defect was discovered or
should have been discovered or within two years after the expiration of
the warranty, whichever occurs first.
§ 10-205. Grant to intermediate purchaser to evade liability.
If a vendor grants an improvement to an intermediate purchaser to
evade any liability to a user and purchaser imposed by this subtitle, the
vendor is liable on the subsequent sale of the improvement by the inter-
mediate purchaser as if the subsequent sale had not been effectuated by
the vendor without regard to the intervening grant.
50. See MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-301 (1983).
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Heckrotte v. Riddle,5 a typical pre-Act court of appeals decision, may
thus be used to illustrate the potential effect of the Act. Factually, the
purchasers in Heckrolte bought a house that, unknown to them, vio-
lated the county zoning set back regulations. The seller had not made
any statement in the land sale contract about the dwelling's location or
compliance with zoning regulations. In affirming the dismissal of the
purchasers' complaint, the court of appeals held that the purchasers
should have exercised reasonable diligence to ascertain compliance
with the zoning regulations. Moreover, the purchasers' acceptance of
the deed created a prima facie presumption that it was in final execu-
tion of the contract of sale, thus determining the rights of the parties.52
Under the Act, 3 failure to state a material fact that "deceives or tends
to deceive" may constitute a deceptive practice.54 Application of this
provision to facts similar to those presented in Heckrotte, for example,
may lead the court to conclude that the seller's silence with respect to
zoning regulations constitutes a deceptive practice. The Act55 thus re-
places common law in those instances in which the Doctrine might
have operated to a consumer's detriment in a real estate transaction.
E Explicit Survival Language
Every Maryland case discussed above dealt with situations where
the contract was silent as to the intent of the parties with respect to
whether any representations and warranties in the contract should sur-
vive. The presumption of merger "is negated when the contract of sale
contains language providing that the agreement shall survive the exe-
cution of the deed."56 In Randolph Hills, Inc. v. Shoreham Developers,
Inc. ," the court addressed the rights of the parties in light of a
"survivability" clause. In that case, a dispute arose after a seller con-
tracted to sell a 32.61 acre parcel of land to a purchaser. The purchaser
filed suit for specific performance and the circuit court directed the
seller to specifically perform its contract. After the closing, at which the
seller conveyed the parcel to the purchaser, the purchaser filed suit to
impose a constructive trust on funds received by the seller between the
date of the contract of sale and the closing for a right of way for a sewer
across the property. The seller defended on the basis that any rights to
these funds were waived by the closing of title to the property and ac-
ceptance of a deed to the remaining parcel. The Randolph Hills court
rejected this contention in stating that the agreement of sale, which
51. 224 Md. 591, 168 A.2d 879 (1961).
52. Id at 595, 168 A.2d at 881.
53. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-301(3) (1983). For the text of this section, see
supra note 48.
54. Id
55. Id § 13-301.
56. Erlewine v. Happ, 39 Md. App. 106, 109, 383 A.2d 82, 84 (1978).
57. 266 Md. 182, 292 A.2d 662 (1972).
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contained specific survival language,5" prevented the merger of the con-
tract provisions into the deed. The court reasoned that "a line of au-
thority. . . concludes that the acceptance of a deed gives rise to aprima
facie presumption that the rights of the parties are determined by the
deed. Such a presumption is clearly negated by a contract provision
that the representations contained in the contract survive the settle-
ment." 9 Thus, a survival clause will assure the parties to a contract
that representations and warranties will remain viable even after execu-
tion and delivery of the deed.6"
IV. DRAFTING MERGER AND SURVIVAL PROVISIONS
Most of the cases and commentary discussed above have dealt
with situations in which a land sale contract is silent as to the survival
of covenants contained in a contract for the sale of property after the
delivery and acceptance of the deed. Maryland courts have expressed a
willingness to enforce specific clauses that manifest the parties' inten-
tion that certain covenants, representations, and warranties will survive
the closing.6 ' It follows that courts will likely enforce a clause stating
that certain covenants, representations, and warranties will merge in
the deed. Accordingly, attorneys representing buyers and sellers must
clearly set forth the intentions of the parties with respect to survival or
merger of particular provisions contained in the contract of sale. The
initial point of analysis should deal with those areas of the contract that
may survive, such as the covenants, representations, and warranties
contained in the contract of sale.
A. Drafting Covenants, Representations, and Warranties
In drafting contractual covenants, representations, and warranties,
the areas of concern must be identified, and may typically include some
or all of the following areas.
58. "[T]he provisions hereof shall survive the execution and delivery of the deed
aforesaid and shall not be merged therein .... Id at 193, 292 A.2d at 668.
59. Id In dictum, the Randolph Hills court reasoned that "a purchaser may continue
to rely on the covenants in the contract, possibly even when he has knowledge of
countervailing facts .... ' .Id at 194, 292 A.2d at 668.
60. The statute of limitations for survival language in a contract not under seal is
three years from the time of the breach. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-
101 (Supp. 1983); see Cotham v. Board of County Comm'rs, 260 Md. 556, 273
A.2d 115 (1971). For a sealed instrument, the statute of limitations is 12 years.
MD. CT. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-102 (Supp. 1983). The mere presence of a
corporate seal without any other reference in the contract to the seal does not
necessarily invoke the 12-year statute of limitations because the seal may have
been impressed merely as prima facie evidence of corporate authority to execute
the contract and not as evidence of the parties' intent to execute the instrument
under seal. General Petroleum Corp. v. Seaboard Terminals Corp., 23 F. Supp.
137 (D. Md. 1938).
61. Randolph Hills, Inc. v. Shoreham Developers, Inc., 266 Md. 182, 292 A.2d 662
(1972); Erlewine v. Happ, 39 Md. App. 106, 383 A.2d 82 (1978).
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1. Title to and Quantity of the Property
A seller is often asked to represent that he owns fee simple market-
able title to property containing a certain area, which is usually mea-
sured in acres of land.62 Many buyers will also insist that title to the
property be insurable by a title insurance company at its regular rates
without exception for title defects, other than those exceptions specified
in the contract. Further, a buyer may require a seller to represent that
a survey will not disclose any title defects, such as encroachments of the
improvements on the property upon the property of another, or en-
croachments on the property being acquired by improvements on ad-
joining property. The parties may agree that if a title defect exists that
will not materially impair the buyer's contemplated use of the property,
the buyer will have the right to elect to proceed with closing without
any adjustment to the purchase price. Then, if a deed to property is
accepted in light of a known title defect, there should be no basis for a
claim that the title warranty in the contract survived the closing.
2. Zoning and Subdivision
A seller may be asked to warrant that the property complies with
all relevant zoning ordinances and subdivision regulations. This may
result in an identification of the current zoning and a specific descrip-
tion of the buyer's contemplated use of the property. If a zoning
change is required or if subdivision is to be accomplished prior to the
closing, the parties should define their respective obligations.
3. Physical Condition of Improvements on the Property
The physical condition of improvements on the property may be
62. The description of the area conveyed may be stated as a certain quantity of land
"more or less," or in an "approximate" amount. Maryland cases indicate that,
unless the purchase price is calculated upon the number of square feet or acres
conveyed, and is not a sale in gross, some variation in area is acceptable and will
not provide a ground for a buyer to attack the conveyance if he believes that he
has been short-changed. See, e.g., Witmer v. Bloom, 265 Md. 173, 288 A.2d 323
(1972) (use of the phrase "more or less" presumptively creates sale in gross, but
court will consider rebuttal evidence); Carozza v. Peacock Land Corp., 231 Md.
112, 188 A.2d 917 (1963) (words "more or less" or "by estimation," while not
employed in the contract being considered, are merely factors to consider in deter-
mining whether a sale was in gross); Kriel v. Cullison, 165 Md. 402, 169 A. 203
(1933) (no warranty as to quantity exists in a sale in gross, often evidenced by
words "more or less"); Wagner v. Bing, 163 Md. 496, 501, 163 A. 199, 200 (1932):
Whenever it appears by definite boundaries, or by words of qualifica-
tion, as 'more or less' or as 'containing by estimation,' or the like, that
the statement of the quantity of acres in the deed is a mere matter of
description, or not of the essence of the contract; the buyer takes the risk
of the quantity, if there is no intermixture of fraud in the case.
fd. (quoting 4 KENT'S COMMENTARY 467 (11th ed. 1867)); Neavitt v. Lightner,
155 Md. 365,142 A. 109 (1928) (phrase "more or less" in deed precludes finding
that vendor, warranted the quantity of land conveyed because these words indicate
that the parties assumed the risk).
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important to a buyer, and the seller may be asked to represent, for ex-
ample, that the roof is in a watertight and sound condition, that the
basement does not leak, that the property does not lie in a flood plain,
that the building is structurally sound, and that the property complies
with all laws, ordinances, rules, and regulations of any governmental
agency or authority having jurisdiction over the property. A buyer
may require that repairs be made prior to closing and may require a
warranty as to the condition of the property, especially in newly con-
structed or renovated improvements. 63
4. Financial Status of Buyer
If a seller has agreed to hold a note or otherwise finance a buyer's
purchase of the property, the buyer may be asked to make certain rep-
resentations about his financial ability to repay the debt assumed. For
instance, at the time the contract is signed, the buyer may be required
to submit current financial statements to the seller. The buyer might
also be required to warrant to the seller that no adverse changes in the
buyer's financial standing will occur prior to closing and that, if a
change does occur, the seller will not be required to consummate the
transaction or will have the right to require payment of the purchase
price in cash.
5. Power and Authority
Both parties may be required to represent to the other that the
entity and the individual executing the contract on behalf of that entity
are authorized and empowered to execute and perform the contract.
For instance, a corporation will be required to represent and warrant
that all necessary corporate action has been taken to authorize its exe-
cution and performance of the contract (e.g., consent by the board of
directors), and that the individual signing the contract on behalf of the
corporation has been duly authorized to do so. Similarly, a partnership
may be required to represent and warrant that all necessary actions
have been taken to authorize the execution and performance of the
contract (e.g., unanimous consent of all or a majority of the general
partners), and that the individual signing the contract on behalf of the
partnership has authority to do so.
6. Miscellaneous
There are many other areas that the parties may believe are crucial
to the bargain, such as the availability of access to and from the prop-
erty to public roads, the existence and the availability of utilities in
63. Even if express warranties are not made in a contract for sale of newly constructed
residential property, the seller may have liabilities arising out of statutory warran-
ties. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 10-201 to -205 (1981). For the text of these
sections, see supra note 49.
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certain stated capacities at the property, the availablity of certain
amenities to the property, such as recreation facilities, and the obliga-
tion of one of the parties (usually the seller) to pay brokers' commis-
sions. Often, the party who is responsible for paying brokers'
commissions will be required to indemnify the other party against any
claims for brokers' commissions not paid as required.
There is little question that attempts to restrict a contractual action
for fraud in the inducement are ineffectual.64 Parties may, however,
expressly or impliedly waive any cause of action for fraud if they real-
ized that specific misrepresentations were in fact fraudulent, and that
they had a cause of action for the fraud.65 Therefore, the effects of
fraud may be waived after, but not before, the fraudulent acts have
occurred, and after these acts are known by the innocent party, to grant
him a cause of action.
Likewise, an attempt to eliminate by contract a cause of action for
accident and mistake would probably fail, but for a reason different
from that applicable to fraud. When a unilateral material mistake of
fact exists, the contract, along with its waiver provision, is voidable by
the mistaken party only if the mistake results from the other party's
culpable conduct, such as fraud, duress, or undue influence.6 6 In com-
parison, a mutual mistake of fact with respect to a material matter af-
64. The court in Pedalty v. George F. Nixon & Co., 288 Ill. App. 294, 305-06, 6
N.E.2d 290, 295 (1937), stated:
[T]here is no authority . .. in support of the proposition that a party
who has perpetrated a fraud upon his neighbor may nevertheless con-
tract with him, in the very instrument by means of which it was perpe-
trated, for immunity against its consequences, close his mouth from
complaining of it, and bind him never to seek redress.
Id (quoting Bridger v. Goldsmith, 143 N.Y. 424, 425, 38 N.E. 458, 459 (1894));
see McInnis & Co. v. Western Tractor & Equip. Co., 63 Wash. 2d 652, 388 P.2d
562 (1964) ("A cause of action in fraud exists even where there is a merger and
disclaimer clause in the contract."); see also Slater v. KFC Corp., 621 F.2d 932
(8th Cir. 1980) (contractual disclaimer does not bar suit based upon fraud in the
inducement); Bankers Trust Co. v. Pacific Employees Ins. Co., 282 F.2d 106, 113
(9th Cir. 1960) (parties' rights are not controlled by contract terms in an action for
deceit), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 822 (1961); Kraft v. Lowe, 77 A.2d 554 (D.C. 1950)
(party cannot rely upon contract provisions to avoid consequences of misrepresen-
tation which induced other to enter into contract); Creamer v. Helferstay, 294 Md.
107, 120, 448 A.2d 332, 338 (1982) (if court finds that party acted fraudulently in
making misrepresentation, then "a basis for rescission of the written contract
would have existed, regardless of the terms of that contract") (emphasis supplied)
(dictum); Bergeron v. Dupont, 116 N.H. 373, 359 A.2d 627 (1976) (merger clause
does not preclude claim of extrinsic fraud); Hampton v. Sabin, 49 Or. App. 1041,
621 P.2d 1202 (1980) (rescission of contract granted).
65. See Holder v. Maaco Enter., 644 F.2d 310, 312 (4th Cir. 1981).
66. Creamer v. Helferstay, 294 Md. 107, 448 A.2d 332 (1982) (culpable conduct not
found); Gross v. Stone, 173 Md. 653, 197 A. 137 (1938); see generally CORBIN,
supra note 8, §§ 608-12; 13 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS §§ 1573, 1577-80 (3d ed. 1970); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 153 (1981).
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fecting the substance of the transaction invalidates the contract67 and
affords a ground for either party to rescind the contract,68 provided, of
course, that the contract waiver provision is not interpreted as placing
on one party the risk of mistake.69
Once the parties have clearly defined the areas of concern that
might affect the buyer's use and enjoyment of the property after the
acquisition or that may affect the seller's security for any deferred por-
tion of the purchase price, the parties will often take the prudent step of
establishing a procedure for inspection and review of matters relating
to the covenants, representations, and warranties. The contract may
thus require the buyer to submit financial statements to the seller and
may provide that the buyer will have certain rights of entry onto the
property for the purpose of satisfying himself as to matters of survey,
the physical condition of the property, the existence of any easements
that may be discovered only by an inspection of the property, and to
perform other tests and studies. The contract should define the buyer's
inspection rights, and the parties may provide that at the conclusion of
these studies, tests, and inspections, the buyer will be considered to
have waived his right to object to these matters if deficiencies or
problems have not been communicated to the seller within a specified
time period.
B. Drafting Merger Provisions
If the parties agree that none of the covenants, representations,
and warranties will survive closing, the contract should say so clearly.
Usually, the seller will be the party most interested in this provision. A
sample merger provision is contained in Appendix II.
C Drafting Survival Provisions
After having defined the respective parties' covenants, representa-
tions, and warranties, and having provided both parties with an oppor-
tunity to inspect and review these matters, the parties may wish to
provide in the contract that these representations shall merge in the
deed, except as otherwise expressly set forth in the contract. Usually,
the buyer will be the party most interested in this provision. Once the
parties agree that certain covenants, representations, and warranties are
to survive, they must determine the period of time for which these rep-
resentations shall remain effective. The parties' attorneys should also
consider and define the knowledge that may be imputed to the seller
and the buyer, through their respective officers or directors, if a corpo-
ration; through their respective general partners, if a partnership; and
67. Wheat v. Cross, 31 Md. 99 (1869).
68. Dood, Inc. v. Universal Realty Co., 215 Md. 261, 137 A.2d 651 (1958); Smith v.
Bounds Package Corp., 206 Md. 74, 110 A.2d 71 (1954); Martz v. Jones, 189 Md.
416, 56 A.2d 30 (1947); Gross v. Stone, 173 Md. 653, 197 A. 137 (1938).
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154 (1981).
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through their respective agents and employees, in any case. Sample
representations, warranties, and survival provisions are contained in
Appendix II. If possible, the most specific drafting rules should be fol-
lowed, with each representation and warranty discussed separately, and
separate survival provisions, if any, set forth for each.
V. CONCLUSION
The Doctrine is a long-standing common law principle that oper-
ates to close the door on a contract for the sale of real property after the
acceptance of the deed consummating that contract. Because strict ap-
plication of the Doctrine may lead to harsh results, the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland has adopted several major exceptions, and has,
especially in the last fifty years, hesitated to apply the Doctrine
mechanically. To avoid the Doctrine's potentially inequitable conse-
quences, reviewing courts will look to the subject matter of collateral
covenants, as well as to the presence of fraud, accident, or mistake, and
will apply relevant statutory exceptions. Practitioners who are aware of
the various statutory and judicially created exceptions can best serve
their clients by careful drafting.
In this area of the law, there can be few, if any, virtues to silence in
a contract of sale and purchase. Some practitioners may have been
content to rely upon the Doctrine, assuming that after the closing no
liabilities could arise other than those expressed in the deed. The
Maryland courts, however, have shown a willingness to enforce only
the expressed intentions of the parties. Absent such an expression, the
range of exceptions is substantial enough to require cautious practition-
ers to set forth either that certain provisions will not survive, or if there
will be survival, which provisions survive and for how long.
[Vol. 13
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BUYER: "This Paragraph - of this Contract shall merge into the
deed for the Property at closing, and Seller shall have no right to bring
any action against Buyer arising out of the matters set forth in this
Paragraph -. "
SELLER: "This Paragraph - of this Contract shall merge into the
deed for the Property at closing, and Buyer shall have no right to bring
any action against Seller arising out of the matters set forth in this Par-
agraph -. "
SAMPLE SURVIVAL PROVISIONS*
BUYER: "All of the covenants and representations and warranties
set forth in this Contract shall survive the execution and delivery of the
deed of the Property hereunder and shall not be merged in the deed."
SELLER: "Only the actual knowledge of the [general partners/exec-
utive officers] of Seller shall be considered to be knowledge of the
Seller. The covenants, representations, and warranties contained in
this Paragraph - of this Contract shall merge into the deed for the
Property at Closing hereunder, except those covenants, representations,
and warranties set forth in Paragraphs - and - hereof, which require
performance after Closing; provided, however, that such covenants,
representations, and warranties shall survive for a period of only one
(1) year after the Closing Date, and shall expire at the end of such one-
year period."
SAMPLE NEGOTIATED REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRAN-
TIES FOR CONTRACT OF SALE OF UNIMPROVED LAND*
"1. The Buyer shall not have the right to enforce, by suit at law, an
action in equity, or otherwise, a representation or warranty of the Seller
hereinafter contained (other than the warranties of title appearing in
the deed) unless the Buyer shall have given Seller written notice within
one (1) year after the Closing Date that Seller has committed a misrep-
resentation or breached a warranty, or both, with respect to a specified
representation or warranty, or both. If the Buyer learns or determines
prior to the Closing Date that a breach of warranty or misrepresenta-
tion on the part of the Seller exists, Buyer agrees it shall promptly no-
tify Seller in writing. Each representation or warranty, or both, as to
which Buyer shall have actual notice prior to the Closing Date that
there exists a material breach, shall expire at Closing, the intent hereof
being that no such known violations shall survive the Closing should
Buyer elect to close notwithstanding such actual notice. Seller repre-
* All capitalized words should be considered to be terms defined in the contract of
sale. The transaction is assumed to be commercial.
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sents and warrants that both on the date hereof and on the Closing
Date:
(a) Seller own good and merchantable title to the Property, in fee
simple, free and clear of any Title Defect (except, prior to Closing, the
Deed of Trust) and insurable as such (but free and clear of the Deed of
Trust) at regular basic rates for the basic coverages under the Title
Company's owner's policy (ALTA-Form B 1970). The Seller is not a
party to any existing contract for the sale or lease of all or any portion
of the Property or any grant of option or right of first refusal to
purchase or lease all or any portion of the Property. Seller warrants
that it shall not place or permit additional liens or encumbrances other
than current real estate tax assessments on the title to the Property be-
tween the date hereof and Closing Date.
(b) The Property is located in a WXY District which is a classification
under the Zoning Ordinance of Baltimore County for an industrial de-
velopment district and permits the use of the Property for offices, ware-
housing, and storage. Said uses are not prohibited by any law,
ordinance, regulation, or deed restriction.
(c) To the best of Seller's knowledge, there are no violations of any
laws, ordinances, orders, regulations, or requirements of any applicable
governmental authority or of any deed restriction affecting any portion
of the Property, and no notice of any such violation has been issued by
any governmental authority or party to any such deed restriction.
Seller warrants that between the date hereof and Closing Date, Seller
shall comply at Seller's sole expense with valid violation notices duly
given to Seller.
(d) Utility systems for the transmission and transportation of electri-
cal energy, water, and sanitary and storm sewers are available in the
bed of the Road, as shown on the Subdivision Plat of the Property.
(e) The Road, the street adjoining the Property, is a public street
dedicated to Baltimore County, Maryland, which will maintain said
street. The Road and the water, sanitary sewer, and storm water facili-
ties servicing the Property and located in the bed of the Road have
been constructed by and at the sole expense of Seller. The cost of de-
velopment of the Road and the said water, sanitary sewer, and storm
water facilities has been paid in full, including all connection and
ready-to-serve charges. There are and will be no assessments by any
governmental authority against the Property or its owner to pay for the
cost of the development of the Road and said utilities. There is no
ordinance or law authorizing any other public improvements pertain-
ing to the Property, the cost of which shall be assessed against the
Buyer.
(f) The Seller has no knowledge of pending or contemplated condem-
nation proceedings affecting the Property, any part thereof or interests
therein.
(g) The Seller is a general partnership organized and existing under
19831
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the laws of the State of Maryland, has the legal power and authority to
own the Property, is duly authorized by all requisite partnership ac-
tions to sell the Property pursuant to the terms and conditions of this
Agreement, and is composed of two (2) partners, Messrs. A and B.
2. Buyer represents and warrants that both on the date hereof and on
the Closing Date, if it is a limited partnership, validly organized and
existing under the laws of the State of Maryland, is duly authorized by
all requisite partnership actions to perform all the terms, covenants,
provisions, and conditions imposed on Buyer hereunder, and that this
transaction is within the purposes for which Buyer was formed.
3. Buyer represents and warrants that between the date hereof and
the Closing Date, there shall have been no material adverse changes in
the financial statements of Buyer delivered to Seller simultaneously
herewith."
